Talk:Powell Doctrine

Date of the Maddow Interview

I'll check back in a day or two, but I believe that the interview was actually taken yesterday, "April 1, 2009." If no one speaks up, I am going to change that date before the weekend Kencomer (talk) 01:35, 3 April 2009 (UTC) I am changing it as I said that I would. Kencomer (talk) 04:04, 6 April 2009 (UTC)

Unclear

As much as I admire General Powell, the 'Powell Doctrine' is not really original. The Chinese military strategist Sun Zi had already stated this 'doctrine' over 2000 years ago in his 'Art of War'. 5 Jan 07

You might well be right, but it's still extremely signficant from a historical point of view that he would adopt this approach and not others. It's interesting to note that the Iraq War failed on almost every count of the Powell Doctrine (except public approval, but that was due in large part to deceptive rhetoric about WMDs), and it's depressing that Powell himself didn't apply his own standards before supporting the conflict as Secretary of State.

This article leaves several things unclear for me.

First, regarding

Powell believes that forces should only be deployed when national interest, commitment, and support have been established.

Can anyone elaborate here? What would Powell say about:

• how the "national interest" is to be determined?
• the meaning of "commitment" and "support"? Are they to be taken as they are implicitly defined in Weinberger's principles of "Will we commit sufficient resources to win?" and "Is there reasonable expectation that the public and Congress will support the operation?" I assume "resources" means chiefly money and troops, but maybe there are other factors for Powell?

Second, I assume Powell himself did not prepackage a particular core of beliefs and label it as the "Powell doctrine". If not, though, does anyone know how the term arose? Who created it? Is "doctrine" meant reverently? Disparagingly?

Finally, is the Powell doctrine, in a nutshell, the belief attributed to Powell quoted above? Or is it a more nebulous thing, that can't really be put into a nutshell at all? Or perhaps it has components not mentioned in this article?

-- Mon Oct 7, 2002

Misquote?

I have a problem with this line:

This part is perhaps best illustrated by his quote (as Secretary of State during the second Iraq War) about the Iraqi Army: "First we're going to cut it off, then we're going to kill it."

I remember during the 1991 Persian Gulf War Powell said this when he was Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CNN showed it all the time. Correcting.

--Hoshie

Weinberger Doctrine

This article would be improved if mention was made of the antecedent Weinberger Doctrine [1], of which the Powell Doctrine is a refinement or restatement. Hopefully someone with more time than I will make the edits, maybe even write a Weinberger Doctrine article. --Kevin Myers 06:14, Apr 13, 2005 (UTC)

I believe that a discussion of both Weinberger and Powell's doctrinal positions should be clarified under the context of Clausewitz. Though this is already just a short stub of an article, the lack of proper contextual background leaves much to be desired since only those with an understanding of these would get much benefit out of this article. 16:18 18 JUN 2005 (PST)

Defenition was incorrect

The line "Powell believes that forces should only be deployed when national interest, commitment, and support have been established" has nothing to do with the Powell Doctrine. The Powell Doctrine has nothing to do with when or why a nation should go to war, only how. I fixed the defenition accordingly.

Should there be a mention of Gulf War II failing the Powell Doctrine test?

I don't trust my own judgment here, since I'm so personally involved in the antiwar movement. But I would put it to any objective editor who sees this to think about discussing the historical context of the Powell Doctrine.

That context ought to include the irony of the second war Powell himself was involved with after his criteria for going to war was popularized. That is, the run up to Gulf War II involved almost a point by point refutation of those criteria (lack of public support, lack of exit strategy, and lack of sufficient or overwhelming force for completing the mission). (unsigned)

Split the difference- "Some opponents of Operation Iraqi Freedom maintain that the execution of this war violates the Powell doctrine..." or words to that effect. Roundeyesamurai 06:11, 28 September 2006 (UTC)

Maybe Bush should have read this before rushing into war. By the way, we do NOT delare war against countries or states that have not attacked us. The "good guys" look pretty bad World wide.

Rumsfeld's Transformation

To be more inclusive it would be interesting to have the article include how Rumsfeld's Transformation repudiates The Powell Doctrine (compare Gulf War I vs. Gulf War II) in terms of clearly defined goals, it being a "just war", and the use (or failure to use) overwhelming force.

Does the Powell Doctrine breach the Principle of Proportionality?

It is said that "This (the Powell Doctrine) may oppose the principle of proportionality, but there are grounds to suppose that principles of Just War may not be violated". Surely, there should be an exact description of what those grounds are? Otherwise, the Powell Doctrine seems to be special pleading for a practice that runs exactly counter to the the principle of proportionality and accordingly contravenes the criteria for the Just War and of both Jus in bello and Jus ad bellum.

Fenton Robb 21:25, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

The idea is to make the fight as unfair as one can, in order to bring hostilities to a conclusion as quickly as possible. The idea is not to kill as many of the enemy as you can, which would, indeed, be an immoral goal. Martin | talk • contribs 05:21, 13 July 2007 (UTC)

Use of overwhelming force results in the least casualties on both sides. Proportionality means different things when it comes to before, during, and after the war. Before (jus ad bellum), "The anticipated benefits of waging a war must be proportionate to its expected evils or harms", during (jus in bello), "An attack cannot be launched on a military objective in the knowledge that the incidental civilian injuries would be clearly excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage (principle of proportionality).", and after (just pos bellum), "Any terms of surrender must be proportional to the rights that were initially violated.". Use of overwhelming force is actually more in line with jus ad bellum and jus in bello. If you merely restricted yourself to using an amount of force equal to the aggressive parties, they would be more likely to bleed themselves dry fighting, rather than surrendering quickly. It's more about showing what you could do, than actually doing it.65.0.172.246 (talk) 18:02, 3 August 2012 (UTC)

Does the Powell Doctrine really advocate breaching the laws governing Military Occupation?

By advising "After victory, the military should leave the field of engagement, rather than staying around as peacekeepers" the Doctrine advises breaching the laws governing military occupation which require the occupying power to preserve law and order and not to leave until a properly constituted authority is established. Surely the Powell Doctrine was qualified - if so - how?

Fenton Robb 22:02, 31 March 2006 (UTC)

Interesting point. I suppose it could be argued however that the occupying force need not be the invading force, and that the invaders could hand over power to a third party while local government is re-established. For example NATO invaded Kosovo, but it was the UN which took over as the long term occupying force while the region's constitutional mess was sorted out. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 212.146.47.250 (talk) 16:59, 6 April 2007 (UTC).

Response to Fenton Robb

I'm going to address both of the above questions in a single statement, simply because they fit together very well (and it keeps me from having to type everything twice).

The Powell doctrine is intended to minimize loss of life on both sides of conflict while allowing for the fastest and most secure military victory. These goals are not contradictory at all- to wit:

1) Overwhelming force- This does not refer to "outnumbering" enemy personnel- during Operation Desert Storm, for instance, the Iraqi forces outnumbered the Coalition forces which participated in combat (though the Coaliation had a greater number of total personnel). It refers to overwhelming the enemy's military capabilities. This means, in short, utilizing more than a sufficient amount of force to eliminate the enemy's weapons systems, communications, and supply distribution as quickly as possible. An army which has nothing to fight with, no communication between commanders and troops, and no supplies, cannot wage war for very long (as seen in Desert Storm). Personnel occupying such equipment (which will never be more than a small fraction of a nation's total military personnel count) are incidental- they are fired upon only in self-defense, as personnel alone are not important in a short-term war of this type (Ref. Desert Storm).

The second part of "overwhelming force" is in its dynamic nature. The greatest casualties for both sides (and the greatest exposure to defeat) comes when combat is static (like the trench fighting in World War One). Quickly moving to, engaging, defeating, and moving forward from the battle accomplishes the task with fewer casualties for both sides (ref. Desert Storm).

The intent of proportionality is to prevent military "bullying", for lack of a better term- the use of military force by a very large, powerful army against much smaller, much weaker armies. In other words, to prevent conquest.

2) Occupation- Powell's doctrine doesn't advocate fighting with a country and then immediately leaving it in chaos (bear in mind the "Pottery Barn" doctrine). It advocates leaving as soon as is practicible, in order to avoid the circumstance which leads to the second greatest loss of life- guerilla war (ref. Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; current war in Iraq).

This is achievable because of the aforementioned elimination of military hardware as a primary goal- a nation doesn't need tanks, warships, missile launchers, and the like, to maintain internal order. It does need personnel for this task- personnel frequently left displaced after their tanks, warships, missile launchers, etc., have been destroyed. These same displaced personnel would, in a protracted occupation, be the instigators and primary participants in a guerilla campaign. So, the decision is to either leave quickly and allow them to police their own nation (ref. Operation Desert Storm), or stay and fight them as an insurgency (ref. current war in Iraq).

I hope this clears things up. Roundeyesamurai 06:38, 28 September 2006 (UTC)

Still, overwhelming force is not a proportional means to a just war. Is there any conceivable situation in which overwhelming force doesn't violate proportionality? Overwhelming force is inherently not proportitional.

Marpeck 17:07, 5 December 2006 (UTC)

Marpeck, I have to ask: Do you actually have military experience? It seems to me that you're trying to sound as though you have knowledge of a subject which you evidently do not.

"Proportionality" means exactly what I described: It prevents a nation with a very large army from "bullying" nations with very small armies. The fact that one side maneuvers multiple units together to engage a single unit, or that vehicles are used against infantry, or anything of that nature, doesn't violate the law of proportionality. It's simply sound tactical doctrine.

Your definition of "proportionality" would require that both sides in a battle be on precisely equal footing- not only is it impracticable, but it would result in an absolute slaughter on both sides (see the aforementioned examples of this phenomenon).

Aside: For the sake of clarity, I moved your comment to below mine, so that each user's comments may be read uninterrupted.

Roundeyesamurai 20:46, 6 December 2006 (UTC)

Marpeck, you misunderstand what proportionality means. It doesn't mean your forces should be small, it means the casualties and damage you cause should be as low as possible. It means that your USE of force should be the lowest needed, but that says nothing about the SIZE of the force deployed. A huge army is huge but if it attacks no one then it causes less destruction than a bloodthirsty small army.

If you use a small force to attack the enemy, you will need to inflict a lot of damage in order to secure a surrender from the enemy, and there will be a lot of deaths. If you use a massive, hugely overwhelming amount of technology and/or troops then the enemy is far more likely to surrender with barely a shot being fired. In many cases during the first Gulf War that's exactly what happened, Iraqi units would surrender without even fighting because they knew the US forces were overwhelmingly more powerful.

In cases like these, deploying overwhelmingly powerful forces can actually be more proportional than a small number of troops, because an overwhelmingly more powerful army makes faster, less bloody surrenders far more likely, and so keeps casualties and damage to the lowest possible level.

The point I'm trying to make is there's a difference between having lots of soldiers and those soldiers actually causing a lot of destruction. Usually, having lots of soldiers actually means you're less likely to have to use them, because few countries want to start a war that they know they might lose.

Decisive Force

I recall Powell commenting on his doctrine in interviews saying that he has been misquoted. It is not necessarily overwhelming force that should be used in assuring victory. Rather one should use decisive force; that is the right mix of numbers of combatants, types of units, and equipment necessary to achieve victory. As others have stated above, the US would want to avoid the appearance of bullying or using inappropriate or disproportionate force to achieve its military and political goals. Also as alluded to above, overwhelming force connotes outnumbering one's enemies on the battlefield. However, with superior technology and better trained personnel, a smaller military force can achieve a decisive victory over a larger one. The US military is fond of talking about force multipliers--the notion that technology, training and tactics can allow one US soldier to do the job of several enemy soldiers. Anyway, I would challenge someone to do the research (sorry I'm too lazy!) to find out about "decisive force" and include more thorough citations in this article. Mego2005 15:32, 3 January 2007 (UTC)

On that note.....

I am unable to find reference to Powell "asserting that when a nation is engaging in war, every resource and tool should be used to achieve decisive force against the enemy, minimizing US casualties and ending the conflict quickly by forcing the weaker force to capitulate." What Powell said to Rachel Maddow (April 1, 2009) was "Decide what you are trying to achieve politically and if it can’t be achieved through political and diplomatic and economic means, you have to use military force, then make sure you know exactly what you’re using the military force for and then apply it in a decisive manner." Maddow Interview with Powell

What Powell does say in his "doctrine" article is this: [excerpts] From: U.S. FORCES: CHALLENGES AHEAD. Powell, Cohn L. Foreign Affairs; Winter92, Vol. 71 Issue 5, p32-45, 14p

It is in the category of the use of "violent" force that views begin to differ.

Occasionally these differences in view have been categorized quite starkly as the "limited war" school and the "all-out war" school. For the man or woman in combat, however, such academic niceties are moot.

All wars are limited. As Carl von Clausewitz was careful to point out, there has never been a state of absolute war. Such a state would mean total annihilation. The Athenians at Melos, Attila the Hun, Tamerlane, the Romans salting the fields of the Carthaginians may have come close, but even their incredible ruthlessness gave way to pragmatism before a state of absolute war was achieved`

Objectives for which we use "violent" force can range from hurting an enemy enough so that he or she ceases to do the thing that is endangering our interests (air strikes against Libya in 1986 to prevent further Libyan-sponsored terrorism), to unseating the enemy's government and altering fundamentally his or her way of life (World War II).

When the political objective is important, clearly defined and understood, when the risks are acceptable, and when the use of force can be effectively combined with diplomatic and economic policies, then clear and unambiguous objectives must be given to the armed forces. These objectives must be firmly linked with the political objectives.

Decisive means and results are always to be preferred, even if they are not always possible. We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the "surgery" is over and the desired result is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation--more bombs, more men and women, more force. History has not been kind to this approach to war-making. In fact this approach has been tragic--both for the men and women who are called upon to implement it and for the nation. This is not to argue that the use of force is restricted to only those occasions where the victory of American arms will be resounding, swift and overwhelming. It is simply to argue that the use of force should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue. Wars kill people. That is what makes them different from all other forms of human enterprise.

By "decisive" I believe Powell means to be "resolute" as in "Firm or determined; unwavering" in meeting the objectives laid out for the use of the force deemed appropriated. Powell does not advocate using "every tool and resource" available to achieve decisive force, that would lead to total war. What he does support is using decisive means to obtain the objectives laid out, meaning that once force is deemed necessary, be firm, determined, and unwavering until you meet that objective or another objective becomes more appropriate. As Powell says: "We owe it to the men and women who go in harm's way to make sure that this is always the case and that their lives are not squandered for unclear purposes." Jeff.R.Bowman (talk) 22:27, 17 July 2011 (UTC)

Reflist Update

I'm a new wikipedia user but the second reference on the page refers to a reuters article that no longer exists.

I found the original and was wondering if someone could update it.

http://westanddivided.blogspot.com/2007/09/is-iraq-like-vietnam-lessons-learned.html

Nonissue (talk) 16:30, 21 April 2009 (UTC)

"noted as not fully applicable for"

I removed this paragraph in the spirit of "be bold", given it lacks citation, its verbal phrase is "has been noted" (by whom?) and its link to "war of choice" redirects to "war of aggression". It's clearly contentious and anyone who favors the paragraph is free to restore it when they have supporting references with which to defend it.

All that said, I also quote the paragraph I elided here for the convenience of its proponents:

The Doctrine has been noted as not fully applicable for policy in conflicts that are [[humanitarian intervention]], [[war of choice]], protracted [[counter-insurgency]] or [[anti-terrorism]], and the criteria are subjective or ambiguous.{{cn|date=May 2016}}

Another version of the Powell Doctrine

I'm no expert in this area, but I happened to be glancing through an ebook edition of Boot, Max (2014). The Savage Wars Of Peace: Small Wars And The Rise Of American Power. Basic Books. ISBN 9780465038664. In chapter 14 there, titled "IN THE SHADOW OF VIETNAM : The Powell Doctrine and Small Wars in the 1990s", I see a version of the Powell Doctrine which differs markedly from the version given in this article. The version given there is (quoting):

(1) "the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interests or that of our allies”; (2) if the U.S. does commit troops, “we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning”; (3) the armed forces should have “clearly defined political and military objectives”; (4) the relationship between ends and means “must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary”; (5) “there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in the Congress”; (6) “finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.”

For comparison, from the article:

1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?
3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
4. Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
7. Is the action supported by the American people?
8. Do we have genuine broad international support?

I looked at the source cited in support of the version given in the article ([2]), and do not see support there for the version given in the article.

It seems to me that this deserves a look by editors with more topical expertise than I. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 11:17, 1 June 2018 (UTC)

I've googled around a bit, and come across this. Appendix A (and, probably, more than that) in there looks to me as if it may be of some use as background here. Wtmitchell (talk) (earlier Boracay Bill) 02:20, 2 June 2018 (UTC)